Abstract
This article considers the political economy of reform under Monti: the coalitional dynamics of the Italian political economy and the government's strategy for passing economic reforms in these circumstances. Monti's government is typically described as technocratic -composed of non-politicians who were in government to solve the acute problems facing the country before turning it back over to elected politicians (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014) . The choice of a technocratic government to solve big Italian problems was not unprecedented. In the 1990s, the governments of Carlo Azeglio Ciampi and Lamberto Dini both governed as technocrats to pass what were regarded as 'necessary' reforms of budgets, pensions, and electoral and government institutions (Pasquino and Valbruzzi 2012: 619) .
Indeed, Schmidt and Gualmini (2013) argue that Monti's appointment simply replicated the Italian trend of alternating periods of opportunistic partisan governments with pragmatic technocratic ones. This article contends instead that the Monti experiment was a radical departure even from previous technocratic Italian governments.
The technocratic governments of the 1990s worked closely with the social partners, particularly labour unions, in order to achieve their reforms, often through negotiated social pacts. The literature on social pacts demonstrated that the cooperation of the unions with these governments enhanced the problem-solving capacity of these fragile governments, giving them both a greater capacity to mobilise social consent and a more informed view of the barriers to implementing successful reform (Rhodes 1998; Culpepper 2002; Baccaro and Lim 2007) . Recent scholarship has shown that the problem-solving capacity of the technocratic governments was a joint product of the support of parties of the left and of labour unions, and that unions used their role in designing reform to deflect some of the costs for their members 4 (Simoni 2010; Barta 2011) . Even more so than partisan governments, Italian technocratic reformers of the 1990s were tightly linked to the organisations of Italian society.
The Monti government emphatically rejected this strategy of reform. Instead, it tried to develop policies autonomously, with little consultation of unions, organised employers, or political parties. In other words, the unelected Monti government attempted to impose an austerity plan without relying on any relays to Italian society to mobilise consent for its difficult reform programme. The Monti interregnum was an experiment in unmediated democracy, which I define as a government actively supported neither by political parties that have won democratic election nor by an encompassing coalition of social groups with the legitimacy and authority to represent large functionally defined groups within society.
1 In other words, unmediated democracy is a situation in which neither political partisanship nor corporatist intermediation connects a government to the society on whose behalf it is adopting reforms.
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In this article I demonstrate how the structure of the Italian political economy and politics led to the emergence of unmediated democracy in 2011. Italian technocratic governments of the 1990s had relied on a temporary unity of purpose between employers, unions, and the political left. It was an ungainly coalition, one that did not survive its internal centrifugal pressures. But given the evolution of the Italian economy, such a societally anchored reform coalition was not available to cope with the crises confronted by the Monti government at the end of 2011. Italy is not the only country in the new periphery of the eurozone that faces the challenges of strong international pressures for reform and a strongly entrenched opposition to such reform at the domestic level. Yet it was the only country to adopt this experiment in 5 unmediated democracy. The Italian experience may therefore shed some light on the possibilities and limitations of such a strategy for adopting unpopular retrenchment programmes during an economic crisis.
Unmediated Democracy
Political parties and secondary associations are the primary forms of participation that link government to society in the rich democracies. Parties have long had to fulfil the dual function of both providing government policy that represents their electoral constituencies and respecting the economic constraints imposed by the global economy (Mair 2009 ). Partisan governments with a governing majority can adopt reforms either by convincing their reluctant members to go along or by trying to shift losses onto their opponents (cf. Garrett 1993) . During the 1990s, many governments that had to adopt significant reform plans but lacked such partisan support used social pacts, involving the preeminent functional organisations of unions and employers' associations, to develop such reforms. These governments employed negotiation with the social partners to legitimise their changes to the social contract of postwar capitalism (Regini 2000; Avdagic 2010 ).
Italy has experienced both pacted and partisan reform during the past two decades. The social pacts of the 1990s saw unions and employers, together with representatives of technocratic governments, negotiate institutional reforms that abolished the old system of wage indexation (1992), introduce a new system of wage bargaining (1993), and adopt substantial reforms of the pension system (1992, 1995) (Rhodes 1998; Culpepper 2008) . These sweeping reforms were achieved by weak governments (those without a partisan majority) which relied on unions to provide 6 them with political cover to put in place such important economic adjustments (Regini 2000; Baccaro and Lim 2007) . The left government of Romano Prodi, which was elected in 1996, followed the technocratic governments of Dini by relying on unions to develop labour-market reforms (Simoni 2010; Schmidt and Gualmini 2013) .
The centre-right coalition under Berlusconi, elected in 2001, showed that
Italian pension reform need not be a product of negotiations with the social partners.
Although the Berlusconi government negotiated with unions and employers, both groups were largely shut out of the 2004 pension reform, which Natali and Rhodes A government practicing unmediated democracy breaks with both of these paths to social legitimation. Such a government relies on parties and their elected representatives not to topple them by withdrawing parliamentary confidence in the government, but it simultaneously renounces the use of the political party as a device to build legitimacy. It justifies this choice by reference to economic constraints or international commitments, rather than using a party apparatus to build social support 7 for it (Karremans 2014 anti-elite movements whose simple solutions make them popular with the public until they run into the world of complex problems. Unmediated democratic governments are elite non-movements whose ability to cope with complex problems means that 8 parties and the public are willing to turn to them until crisis abates, when the fundamental unpopularity of austerity will doom them at the ballot box.
Some might argue that unmediated democracy is really the only choice Italy had, given the international constraints facing the government that took office in way around this blocked society by trying to ignore it, but the character of this gambit was always going to be a temporary fix. The government was unable to define partisan goals, and so it had to justify every reform by reference to the need for shared sacrifice, without having any grassroots organisation to legitimise the sacrifice demanded. The result was that the state, weakened by the fault lines of interest group conflict on which it rests, imposed sacrifices where it could, which did not always make for the perception of shared sacrifice. The government had no natural electoral constituency on which to depend, and austerity policy does not offer an obvious material way to build one. Its source of popularity was the belief in public opinion that there was no alternative to it. Yet democratic government that does not build stronger links to society is of necessity a temporary one, because it has a narrow constituency and few friends.
Italian Capitalism and Interest Groups
Scholars of capitalism sometimes leave Italy out of their comparative frameworks because the Italian model is so heterogeneous. It comprises internationally competitive large industries and networks of small and medium firms in the north and 10 centre of the country. These firms, and the web of institutions that have grown up around them, resemble the coordinated market economies of northern Europe (Soskice 1990; Locke 1995; Culpepper 2007; Hall and Gingerich 2009) . However, the union movement is divided along political lines, and that movement has only periodically engaged in cooperation with employers (Simoni 2010 (Barta 2011) . These groups were in political disarray following the collapse of the Christian Democratic Party.
The economic reforms of the 1990s were a product of this unusual period. But the producers' coalition, like the north-south one that opposed it, was internally contradictory. Unions initially had an interest in securing their own prerogatives vis-à-vis the COBAS, more radical local competitors (Locke and Baccaro 1996) Before the eurozone crisis ever began, this was the social situation in Italy.
And it was against this backdrop that Mario Monti assumed office. His strategy would mark a radical departure from that of the technocratic reformers of the 1990s.
The Monti Programme
The means. An increase of 25 per cent in gasoline tax took the price to almost €7 per gallon, the second highest price in the eurozone (Randall 2013) . Increases in valueadded tax (VAT), which had been passed by the Berlusconi government but delayed in implementation to avoid political repercussions, also came into force, as did taxes that had previously been waived on owner-occupied first residences. These tax increases affected the entire population, of course, but because of the regressive structure they had proportionally greater impact on those taxpayers of more modest means (Livini 2011) . 4 However, from the point of view of the state they were easily collected.
This was not the case of the luxury taxes included by the Monti government in the Save Italy decree as a way to spread the pain of austerity across the population.
The new budget also included measures aimed to reduce tax evasion, such as lowering the amount that could be used for a cash purchase to €1,000. This measure was accompanied by highly visible raids of the tax police on the playgrounds of wealthy Italians in the winter of 2011, such as the posh ski resort of Cortina and a main shopping street in Milan. Nevertheless, eight months after the passage of Save Italy, the Revenue Service reported that the luxury tax on high-priced cars, boats, and airplanes had generated only €92 million of the €387 million predicted. As Monti said in a television interview, 'there are rich and middle-income Italians who systematically do not pay their taxes' (Mobili 2012 ). Yet tax enforcement continues to 15 be a sensitive political issue. In the final act of the government before the electionsthe Stability Law of 2013 -the government earmarked all income from increased surveillance of tax evasion to go into a fund devoted to the structural reduction of fiscal pressure on firms and families.
On the side of spending cuts, the most important reforms came through changes to the pension system. Government estimates put the savings from the pension reform at €5.4 billion by 2014, set to rise to more than €20 billion by 2020.
The reform moved completely to a defined-contribution system (a movement begun in 1995); raised the retirement age for women in the private sector to 62, which is to increase further until it equals that of men (67) Monti experiment suggests it will not be born from a reform plan beloved in Brussels but without substantial support in Italian civil society.
